

Message Text

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00149 111917Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 ACDE-00

/026 W

----- 100786

O P 111810Z APR 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2555

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 0149

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 11,
1975 (SALT TWO-609)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 11, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, APRIL 11, 1975

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IT HAS BEEN
REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING MUST
BE FULLY AND EFFECTIVELY EMBODIED IN THE ARTICLES AND PROVI-
SIONS OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. THIS
IS PRECISELY THE APPROACH OF THE SOVIET SIDE, BASED ON PRIN-
CIPLE, WHICH IS CONCRETELY REFLECTED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREE-
MENT AND IN ALL THE STATEMENTS OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT
THIS PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00149 111917Z

THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF MARCH 4,

1975 NOTES: "THE U.S. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE BASIS FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS CONTAINED IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE INITIATED BY THE TWO SIDES ON DECEMBER 10, 1974. OUR TASK IS TO TRANSFORM THE UNDERSTANDINGS RECORDED IN THAT AIDE-MEMOIRE INTO THE APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE OF A FORMAL AGREEMENT THAT WOULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TO OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS."

THUS THE SIDES ARE OF ONE MIND ABOUT THE MAIN THING--THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT MUST STRICTLY AND PRECISELY CORRESPOND TO THE DECISIONS ADOPTED AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THE SOVIET SIDE PERCEIVES THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE TO BE A GUARANTEE THAT THE TASK PLACED BEFORE THE DELEGATIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY AND ON TIME.

AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE COURSE OF WORK ON THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES HAVE BECOME APPARENT. THEY HAVE TO DO WITH THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED AT TIMES, WHICH ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE CONTENT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974. IN THIS CONNECTION, IN AMPLIFICATION OF THE PREMISES CITED IN THE STATEMENTS OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE FEBRUARY 26, MARCH 18 AND 21, 1975 MEETINGS, TODAY WE WOULD LIKE TO SET FORTH SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON A QUESTION OF SUCH GREAT SUBSTANCE IN TERMS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AS THE LIMITATION ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH SUCH MISSILES.

LET US TURN TO THE TEXT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974. SUBPARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THAT DOCUMENT STATES: "WHEN A BOMBER IS EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS, EACH OF SUCH MISSILES WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER (2400)."

IT UNAMBIGUOUSLY FOLLOWS FROM THE CITED FORMULATION THAT THIS IS A QUESTION OF PRECISELY ALL MISSILES OF THAT RANGE, AND THAT EACH SUCH MISSILE, WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEN, WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT IN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00149 111917Z

NUMBER BEING ESTABLISHED FOR STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. CONSEQUENTLY THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF SOME ONE TYPE OF THESE MISSILES, BUT OF ALL MISSILES OF THAT TYPE, INCLUDING BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES WITH SUCH A RANGE. THIS PROVISION IS FORMULATED WITH UTMOST JURIDICAL PRECISION AND STRICTNESS IN ARTICLE II, SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C) OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, WHICH SAYS THAT "WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OF ANY TYPE WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE

WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT IN THE ABOVE AGGREGATE NUMBER."

AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENTS OF FEBRUARY 10 AND 21, AS WELL AS MARCH 4 AND 10, JUST AS THE MARCH 5, 1975 DRAFT TEXT ITSELF, SHOW THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM A CLEARLY UNFOUNDED INTERPRETATION OF THAT PROVISION IN SAYING THAT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS MUST INCLUDE ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THAT TYPE. MOREOVER, AN ASSERTION WAS MADE IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 10, 1975, ALLEGING THAT "THE SOVIET DRAFT GOES BEYOND THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING IN INCLUDING AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES 'OF ANY TYPE' IN THE AGGREGATE." SUCH ASSERTIONS ARE DEVOID OF ANY FOUNDATION.

THIS IS TOO SERIOUS A QUESTION TO ALLOW SO FREE AN INTERPRETATION OF AGREED PROVISIONS. HERE, AS IN ALL THE OTHER CASES, IT IS NECESSARY TO FOLLOW STRICTLY THE CONTENT OF WHAT WAS AGREED IN VLADIVOSTOK AND WHAT WAS PRECISELY EXPRESSED IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE WHICH FOR THE DELEGATIONS IS A DOCUMENT CONSTITUTING A DIRECTIVE.

THIS ENSUES FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION. IT IS PERFECTLY OBVIOUS THAT IF ONE WERE TO FOLLOW THE APPROACH CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT OF MARCH 5, WITH RESPECT TO AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, IT WOULD TURN OUT THAT THE SIDES, HAVING AGREED TO LIMIT ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THIS TYPE, WOULD LEAVE OPEN ANOTHER QUITE SUBSTANTIAL CHANNEL FOR A BUILDUP IN DELIVERY VEHICLES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY OTHER AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS, AND WOULD THEREBY GIVE AN IMPETUS TO UNLEASHING COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN A NEW DIRECTION. NATURALLY, TO TAKE SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD MEAN TO ENCOURAGE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00149 111917Z

SHIFTING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE FROM ONE SPHERE INTO ANOTHER; THIS DOES NOT IN ANY WAY CORRESPOND TO THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, AND IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF RESTRAINT, RECORDED BY THE SIDES IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. OF MAY 29, 1972.

IN STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION ON FEBRUARY 6, 12, 18 AND MARCH 4 AND 18, AND ALSO IN CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS, OUR SIDE PROVIDED RATIONALE SHOWING THAT SUCH AN INTERPRETATION OF THE QUESTION UNDER CONSIDERATION CONFLICTS WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, AND THAT ATTEMPTS TO RELEGATE, FOR EXAMPLE, AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS TO A SEPARATE CATEGORY, AND ON THAT BASIS TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM AMONG

THE SYSTEMS BEING LIMITED, ARE UNFOUNDED. ATTEMPTS AT ARBITRARY INTERPRETATION OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN A DESIRE TO KEEP OPEN A CHANNEL FOR A BUILDUP IN STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. BUT THIS IS A DANGEROUS PATH; MOREOVER, AS HISTORY SHOWS, IT IS LIKELY TO BE DANGEROUS PRECISELY FOR THAT SIDE WHICH WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN UNLEASHING A RACE IN SUCH ARMS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT IS FOR THIS VERY REASON THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED PROVISION ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS HAS BEEN RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE.

A CAREFUL AND RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE TO WHAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. AGREED UPON MUST UNDERLIE THE SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVENESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL ENSURE PRODUCTIVE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN OUR WORK AND WILL HELP TO REMOVE DIFFICULTIES ALONG THE WAY TO WORKING OUT AN AGREED TEXT OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE SOVIET SIDE FIRMLY PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE PROVISION OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE ON LIMITING AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM MUST BE FULLY AND PRECISELY EMBODIED IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. IN SO DOING,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 SALT T 00149 111917Z

AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES MUST INCLUDE SUCH MISSILES OF ALL TYPES--BALLISTIC MISSILES AS WELL AS CRUISE MISSILES, INCLUDING THE EXISTING U.S. HOUND DOG MISSILES. UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SALT (ARMS CONTROL), SPEECHES, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SALTT00149
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750127-0563
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750460/aaaacdkgk.tel
Line Count: 204
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 JUN 2003 by WorrelSW>; APPROVED <19 JUN 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 11, 1975 (SALT TWO-609)
TAGS: PARM, (SEMENOV, V S)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006